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Ordoliberalism is not Responsible for Jihadist Terrorism
in Europe – A Reply to Van der Walt (2016)

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Ordoliberalism is not Responsible for Jihadist Terrorism in Europe – A Reply to Van der Walt (2016)*

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Johan van der Walt (hereafter referred to as VDW) is indisputably an excellent scholar in legal philosophy who is well-versed in Catholic, Protestant and Calvinist theology, the work of, inter alia, Giorgio Agamben and Hans-Georg Gadamer and who makes interesting use of the notion of de-hermeneuticisation. Clearly, the recent terrorist attacks in France and Belgium made a strong impression upon his research endeavours. In this context, his attempt to explain the genesis of homegrown Islamist terrorism in Europe using his expertise is understandable. However, juxtaposing one's own expertise upon disjointed fragments of less well understood research from other fields does not necessarily lend itself to convincing scholarship. VDW's argument in *When one religious extremism unmasks another: Reflections on Europe's states of emergency as a legacy of ordo-liberal de-hermeneuticisation*¹ rests crucially upon assumptions about the current economic crisis, ordoliberalism and the genesis of terrorism; however, the author fails to demonstrate valuable academic expertise in these topics. We strongly doubt that the simple mechanics of VDW's argument support the assertion that – with or without a process of de-hermeneuticisation – protestant ethics led to ordoliberalism, which resulted in an imposed austerity in France and ultimately Jihadist terrorism. This causal chain is not only highly questionable, but also its underlying assumptions are, in fact, inaccurate.

Scarcity vs. Redistribution

We begin by examining the economic arguments in VDW's article. VDW states “economic scarcity is never a naturally given phenomenon” (p. 80). We agree with VDW that, on a very general level, it is true that the socio-cultural environment we live in strongly influences our theoretical and normative reasoning about the world. However, VDW is much more specific here when he asserts that “economic scarcity” is a phenomenon that is *never* given naturally, or to put it positively: scarcity is a mentally constructed notion. We strongly disagree with the absolute character of this statement and want to give reasons to believe that “economic scarcity” is, to a large extent, indeed the result of the interplay of naturally given phenomena. In fact, we would say that most economists believe that scarcity, in the first place, is not a mental or normative construct. In economic theory, the scarcity problem results from the fact that while resources are limited in amount, people nevertheless desire them in an infinite amount. The implication of scarcity is the need to sacrifice one resource for another. Henceforth, people

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¹ Van der Walt, J. (2016). When one religious extremism unmasks another: Reflections on Europe's states of emergency as a legacy of ordo-liberal de-hermeneuticisation. *New Perspectives*, 24(1), 79-101.

begin competing for scarce resources and engaging in voluntary economic exchange. This mechanism guarantees mutual benefits from trade, and thus a steady increase in social welfare, if detrimental information asymmetries and power concentrations are prevented on both sides of the market.²

VDW asserts that a lack of resources (or at least the prevailing belief in “economic scarcity”) has substantially contributed to the social unrest in Molenbeek, Belgium, or the *cités* around Paris. The resulting socioeconomic grievances allegedly spawned terrorism. While this claim may possibly have some merit,³ though the mono-causality of it is at least questionable,⁴ VDW falsely accuses ordoliberal economic theory for a de-politicisation (or how he puts it: de-hermeneuticisation) of the notion of *resource scarcity*. However, economic scarcity is a purely technical notion that follows from the economic model; it cannot be de-politicised in practical discourse since it has never been political in the first place. It *descriptively* refers to the total resources available to the private *and* the public players at any given point in the economic exchange process. One may agree with VDW stating that there are “vast pockets of surplus wealth [that] remain exempted from the constructive redistribution of social resources” (p. 80). This however is a problem of *resource distribution* and not of *resource scarcity*. Economic theory acknowledges that the former is a politico-economic or constitutional problem, whereby the latter is generically economic, i.e. calculative, in nature.⁵ Since the state has the power to set legal rules for the market game, e.g., via tax policies, it is free to shift the balance between private and public pockets (*redistributive problem*),⁶ while it cannot extend the total amount of available resources in the game (*scarcity problem*). If there are players who lack the necessary resources to participate in the market game (as it is the case for some people in Molenbeek or in the *cités*), this is a distributional, i.e. political, problem in the first place, and not a problem of economic scarcity. The sovereign French government (that would certainly oppose VDW’s implicit claim of being influenced by an ordoliberal agenda set by the Germans) decided prior to the financial crisis not to support these places sufficiently. Instead, it chose, for example, *not* to tax the rich (which is in line with VDW) as well as to spend resources preferably on a large, Bismarckian-style welfare state known to perpetuate social stratification, with the inhabitants of the *cités* certainly being on very low strata.⁷

² This kind of reasoning follows from Lionel Robbins classic definition of economics as “the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”; see: Robbins, L. (1932). *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*. London: Macmillan. For a seminal work about scarcity and exchange in economics, see Buchanan, J.M. (1964). What should economists do? *Southern Economic Journal*, 213-222. For a formal discussion of the necessary conditions for the first theorem in welfare economics, see Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., & Green, J.R. (1995). *Microeconomic theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

³ The beneficial effects of the welfare state in countering homegrown terrorism have been shown, inter alia, by Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2010). Terrorism in the worlds of welfare capitalism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(6), 902-939. The authors show that welfare spending in fields close to the “typical” terrorist (who may be young and lack economic opportunities or who is sympathetic toward this group of people) generally discourages terrorist activity more effectively. These fields include health care spending and active labor market policies.

⁴ We will return to this issue at the end of our contribution.

⁵ Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The constitution of economic policy. *The American Economic Review*, 77(3), 243-250.

⁶ One may argue that the state, while having the power to tax, may not have the willingness to use this power. This could be due to increasingly fundamentalised, de-hermeneuticised politico-economic agendas, which lead to a general de-politicisation. VDW seems to assume that ordoliberalism is one of these agendas, which is, however, at odds with the strong role ordoliberalism ascribes to the state, see Bonefeld, W. (2012). Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism. *New Political Economy* 17, 633-656.

⁷ Bonoli, G. (1997). Classifying welfare states: a two-dimension approach. *Journal of Social Policy*, 26(03), 351-372. Krieger, T., & Traub, S. (2011). Wie hat sich die intra-generationale Umverteilung in der staatlichen Säule des Rentensystems verändert? Ein internationaler Vergleich auf Basis von LIS-Daten. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 231(2), 266-87. Krieger, T., & Traub, S. (2013). The Bismarckian factor: A

VDW most likely did not intend to pursue this particular line of reasoning. Rather, he appears to claim that – beyond tax cuts for the rich and insufficient material support for the poor (Muslims?) – France lacks resources overall. Arguably, this is caused by stern austerity measures imposed by the Germans or, more specifically, German ordoliberals. However, the amount of resources available to any country is determined ultimately by its total “output” (i.e. its *domestic product*). In a low productivity-growth environment, spending additional resources is only possible through borrowing from others (domestic and foreign investors, or future generations).⁸ However, the accruing public debt must be repaid at some point in time. The problem is that investors are wary of lending money to countries with high perceived risk due to debt or other – often institutional – weaknesses, especially when less risky alternatives are available. On the same note, if the risk is perceived to be identical, investors often prefer to invest in a more dynamic and promising nation.

This phenomenon occurred in Germany in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The introduction of a common currency led to the impression that country risks were becoming indistinguishable in the Eurozone. Thus, portfolio capital and investments funnelled into the more dynamic southern parts of Europe rather than Germany,⁹ which was dubbed the “sick man of the euro” by *The Economist* in 1999.¹⁰ Since the financial crisis of 2008, France and the southern European countries have faced similar problems. Neither domestic nor international investors are willing to risk their assets on these uncertain economies. While this could be a temporary problem caused only by the current crisis, this is doubtful. More likely, global investors dislike investing in these countries precisely because they “have long traditions of relying on morally and politically quite acceptable combinations of state debt and inflationary measures to sustain socio-economic coherence and minimum levels of social equality” (p. 88).

Given that many countries compete for *scarce* investment capital, those nations with low debt, low inflation rates and competitive firms have a clear economic advantage. Regaining the trust of investors poses a difficult problem and may require economic as well as political and social reforms that hurt domestic citizens. VDW chooses to label these reforms as “imposed austerity” and traces them back to ordoliberal influence. However, this is not very convincing since the overwhelming number of international investors are likely not familiar with the term nor the concept of “ordoliberalism”. For them, investment decisions follow “normal” business sense, i.e., a simple cost-benefit calculus that is currently not in favour of investing in Southern Europe.

Ordoliberalism: The Wrong Culprit (& Far From Hegemonic)

Contrary to VDW’s bold claim about its hegemonic influence, the teaching of ordoliberalism (or “Freiburg School economics”) plays practically no role in any prominent economics or business studies curriculum in Europe (not to mention the prestigious Anglo-Saxon graduate programs where much of the European political elite is educated). If this observation about the academic marginalisation of ordoliberalism holds true, then it seems reasonable to question

measure of intra-generational redistribution in international pension systems. *CESifo DICE Report* 11(1), 64-66. For a more general discussion of the welfare state from an economics perspective, see: Barr, N.A. (2012). *The economics of the welfare state*. 5th edition. Oxford University Press.

⁸ Obstfeld, M., & Rogoff, K. (1995). The intertemporal approach to the current account. *Handbook of International Economics* 3, 1731-1799. Auerbach, A.J., Gokhale, J., & Kotlikoff, L.J. (1994). Generational accounting: A meaningful way to evaluate fiscal policy. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 8(1), 73-94.

⁹ Sinn, H.-W., & Wollmershäuser, T. (2012). Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: The ECB's rescue facility. *International Tax and Public Finance* 19, 468-508.

¹⁰ *The Economist* (1999): *The Sick Man of the Euro*. URL: <http://www.economist.com/node/209559>.

from where the performative power of the ordoliberal theory over policy-makers or the electorate should originate. Furthermore, it casts doubt upon whether a comparison of the dehermeneuticisation inherent in modern Islam and ordoliberalism can serve any meaningful purpose from the very outset.

The problematic arguments continue with VDW's assertion of "an economy not suited for [imposed austerity]". If austerity implies cutting prices, wages and public debt in order to regain competitiveness or investor's trust, no country is suited for it. When Germany was still the *sick man of Europe*, the other European nations provided useful advice to the country. These suggestions included mainly structural reforms such as cutting back the welfare state (note that the advice did not include any offer of financial support). German politicians followed this – very ordoliberal-sounding – advice and actually introduced several reforms while labour unions and employers' associations agreed on moderate wage increases at the same time.¹¹ Although these self-imposed austerity measures led to a (very) slow recovery of the German economy, they also resulted in severe political disruptions including the founding of a new left-wing party. Surprisingly, in the light of VDW's argument, they did not lead to more Jihadist terrorism. Today, countries like France are in a similar situation and there is little hope that some kind of ideologically biased economic rhetoric could resolve the existing structural problems without any harm to either present or future generations – note that this is a pragmatic rather than an ordoliberal statement.

There is, however, hope for those who dislike this pessimistic narrative about the state of the French economy: redistribution of resources between countries. The crux of VDW's argument focuses on the criticism that Germans lack solidarity with their neighbours. Obviously, the EU treaties do not allow for any kind of bailout,¹² but instruments like Eurobonds would easily bypass this legal problem. Eurobonds would have interest rates higher than those in Germany, but lower than the ones in France. Hence, Germany would pay some of the debt obligations of other countries and lose some of its competitiveness vis-à-vis the southern European member states. Not surprisingly, German voters dislike this idea, regardless of whether or not they think like ordoliberals.¹³

The litmus test for VDW's hypothesis about the ordoliberal imprint on Europe is therefore a simple one: would the French (assuming that they do not adhere to ordoliberal principles) behave differently if they were in the same situation as the Germans? Would they share their national resources unconditionally with their poorer neighbours? Would they do so even if they knew that their neighbours did not use economically successful times to reform their economy, but funnelled their resources into highly problematic sectors like banking and construction (in the case of Spain)? If increasing tax revenues resulted in increasing public debts because no efforts were made to use the additional revenues to keep the debt in check, would France be willing to help their neighbours financially? While it is clearly difficult to answer these questions, the corollary is that it might simply be national egoism, the egoism of private investors or the lack of European solidarity that resulted in the demand for austerity, rather than ordoliberal thinking.

¹¹ See for an excellent account of the German economic recovery and the role of labor-market reforms: Dustmann, C., Fitzenberger, B., Schönberg, U., & Spitz-Oener, A. (2014). From sick man of Europe to economic superstar: Germany's resurgent economy. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(1), 167-188.

¹² Article 125 of the Lisbon treaty contains the so-called 'no bail-out' clause which makes it illegal for one member state to assume the debts of another.

¹³ The following two articles reflect the German opinion quite well, see: Young, B., & Semmler, W. (2011). The European sovereign debt crisis: Is Germany to blame? *German Politics & Society*, 29(1), 1-24; and: Fuest, C., & Peichl, A. (2012). European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'? *CESifo Forum*, Vol. 13, No. 1.

Having said this, one may wonder whether ordoliberalism really lies at the core of the problem in a country like France. Most of the problems described above refer to a way of economic thinking that is typically ascribed to the ‘ice-cold logic of a new global capitalism’, which lacks sentiment and solidarity. The ideas concerning austerity actually originated in the 1980s in Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s America, where the concept of a minimal state, propagated by libertarian economists like Friedrich August von Hayek,¹⁴ Milton Friedman and Murray Rothbard received much attention. From there, their ideas slowly spilled over into the states of the European continent. In other words, the recipes that are being applied in Europe (including Catholic Poland), but also in the US today are not ordoliberal, but libertarian or neoliberal. The distinction between these liberal schools of thought is much more complex than thinking of ordoliberalism as ‘neoliberalism with rules’. At the heart of the distinction lies the role of the state.¹⁵ It seems that VDW interestingly chose not to dig deeper into these crucial differences, as his selection of references indicates (see endnote 15).

Mis-labelling Ordoliberalism, Neoliberalism, Protestantism and Terrorism

Unfortunately, most writings by ordoliberal scholars were never translated from German into English. If VDW had read these original texts or at least the contributions of scholars with a deep understanding of German ordoliberalism (such as Viktor Vanberg¹⁶), he would probably have started questioning his own assumptions about the ordoliberal program. The ordoliberals, especially members of the Freiburg School, were very conscious of the need to include a strong social welfare element in their program. After all, there were millions of war widows, orphans, refugees, expellees and people who had been bombed out who could not be neglected or exposed to the harsh winds of a competitive market economy. In his *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik* (1952), Walter Eucken, the most prominent proponent of the Freiburg School, acknowledges explicitly the state’s role for implementing social policies.¹⁷ He subsumes them under the expression special social policy (*Spezielle Sozialpolitik*), which is intended to attenuate social misfortune and economic tragedies that cannot be balanced through private insurance or individual assets.¹⁸

Moreover, Eucken explicitly states that the competitive market order might lead to an income distribution that is undesirable from a social point of view and which ought to be corrected by the use of a progressive income tax if necessary.¹⁹ This proposal reaches far beyond the simple

¹⁴ Note that the influence of Hayek (who was the director of the Walter Eucken Institute in Freiburg from 1964 to 1970) on these developments has to be attributed to his “Austrian” economic research program, in which he had shifted away from ordoliberalism in the tradition of Walter Eucken at a very early stage. Ludwig von Mises, the intellectual father of Hayek, once called the ordoliberals “ordo-interventionists” to stress the distinction between the Austrians and the Freiburg School of economics, see: Kolev, S. (2016). Ludwig von Mises and the “Ordo-interventionists” – more than just aggression and contempt?. *Working Paper for the Colloquium on Market Institutions & Economic Process*, New York University.

¹⁵ Kolev, S. (2013). *Neoliberale Staatsverständnisse im Vergleich*. Lucius & Lucius. For a position that stresses the civilizing role of the state in the ordoliberal tradition contrary to the minimal state in the neoliberal tradition, see Ulrich, P. (2010). *Zivilisierte Marktwirtschaft: Eine wirtschaftsethische Orientierung*. Bern/Stuttgart/Wien: Haupt Verlag.

¹⁶ Vanberg, V. (1997). Die normativen Grundlagen von Ordnungspolitik. *ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 48, 707-726; Vanberg, V.J. (2003). Friedrich A. Hayek und die Freiburger Schule. *ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 54, 3-20; Vanberg, V.J. (2009). Wettbewerb und Regelordnung (Vol. 55). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Vanberg, V. (2004). The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism. Freiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics, No. 04/11.

¹⁷ Eucken, W. (1952/2004). *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*, 7th edition, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

¹⁸ Eucken, W. (1952/2004). *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*, 7th edition, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 318 ff.

¹⁹ „Die Ungleichheit der Einkommen führt dahin, dass die Produktion von Luxusprodukten bereits erfolgt, wenn dringende Bedürfnisse von Haushalten mit geringem Einkommen noch Befriedigung verlangen. Hier also bedarf

support of social insurance systems for which Germans have always sympathized, and which can easily be justified on moral *and* efficiency grounds.²⁰ In summary, VDW's assertion that ordoliberals "[...] are not interested in the historical circumstances and structural conditions that exclude millions of people from ever entering this order" (p. 87) is a presumptuous perversion of the significance Eucken attributed to social concerns in his oeuvre.²¹

Regarding the connection between ordoliberalism and Protestantism, VDW's argument remains dubious as well. Firstly, in Appendix 4 (written by Eucken) of the *Denkschrift des Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreises* (1942/43),²² the most theologically-inspired contribution of the Freiburg School, theological requirements stand equally next to theoretical economic considerations and practical aspects of the economy.²³ Secondly, one must not ignore the strong upsurge in general religious feeling among both Protestants and Catholics before and after 1945, which readily explains references of ordoliberals like Eucken to a god-given order.²⁴ This order was originally meant as the diametric opposite of the Third Reich, a truly godless time. Lastly, while many early scholars from Freiburg were undoubtedly influenced by Protestantism, they are only one fraction within German ordoliberalism. Especially after Ludwig Erhard and Alfred Müller-Armack enriched the ideas from Freiburg with a catholic social perspective to form the Social Market Economy, a dominance of Protestant thinking that continues until today is doubtful.²⁵

At this point, VDW could argue that we, as ordoliberals, due to the process of de-hermeneuticisation have turned blind-eye on our problematic tradition and religiously framed theoretical basis. We cannot exclude this possibility, but if we ignore ordoliberalism for a moment and look into any mainstream economics textbook on (macro-)economics and economic policy, we will find the same arguments that we presented here. Typically, these textbooks do not rely on ordoliberalism at all.²⁶ Hence, our assertion is that the European

die Verteilung, die sich in der Wettbewerbsordnung vollzieht, der Korrektur. (...) Die Steuerpolitik kann z.B. dazu benutzt werden, um diese Korrektur teilweise zu vollziehen. Das eben ist der Sinn der Steuerprogression.“ (Eucken, W., 1952/2004. *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*, 7th edition, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 300 f.). For a broader discussion of the notion of taxation in Eucken's oeuvre, see Gerken, L. & A. Renner (2000). *Die ordnungspolitische Konzeption Walter Euckens*. In: Lüder Gerken (ed.): *Walter Eucken und sein Werk: Rückblick auf den Vordenker der sozialen Marktwirtschaft*. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 20.

²⁰ See chapter 4 in Breyer, F., & Buchholz, W. (2008). *Ökonomie des Sozialstaats*. Springer-Verlag.

²¹ For an excellent discussion of the interdependence between Walter Eucken's notion of the competitive order and his understanding of social policy, see Volkert, J. (1991): *Sozialpolitik und Wettbewerbsordnung: Die Bedeutung der wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Konzeption Walter Euckens für ein geordnetes sozialpolitisches System der Gegenwart*. *ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* 42, 91-115.

²² The main text of the *Denkschrift* has later been published as „*In der Stunde Null. Die Denkschrift des Freiburger »Bonhoeffer-Kreises«: Politische Gemeinschaftsordnung. Ein Versuch des christlichen Gewissens in den politischen Nöten unserer Zeit*, eingeleitet von Helmut Thielicke, mit einem Nachwort von Philipp von Bismarck“. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1979. The appendices can be found in Brakelmann, G., & Jähnichen, T. (eds.)(1994). *Die protestantischen Wurzeln der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Ein Quellenband*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994.

²³ Goldschmidt, N. (1998). *Christlicher Glaube, Wirtschaftstheorie und Praxisbezug. Walter Eucken und die Anlage 4 der Denkschrift des Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreises*. *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen*, 5, 33-48.

²⁴ Gerken, L. & A. Renner (2000). *Die ordnungspolitische Konzeption Walter Euckens*. In: Lüder Gerken (Ed.): *Walter Eucken und sein Werk: Rückblick auf den Vordenker der sozialen Marktwirtschaft*. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, p. 25; see also: Schramm, M. (2002). *Eröffnung der Kontingenz gesellschaftlicher Ordnungen. Die Kirchen als ordnende Potenz nach Walter Eucken*. In: Pies, I., & Leschke, M. (Eds.) *Walter Euckens Ordnungspolitik*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 145 f.

²⁵ Erhard, L., & Müller-Armack, A. (1972). *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*. Frankfurt: Ullstein.

²⁶ If one examines one of the most widely used introductory textbooks to economics, Mankiw's "Principles of Macroeconomics", the term ordoliberalism is not mentioned a single time (Mankiw, N.G. (2014). *Principles of macroeconomics*. Cengage Learning). This is not different in other classic textbooks on macroeconomics, see, for one: Blanchard, O.J., & Fischer, S. (1989). *Lectures on macroeconomics*. MIT press. Even in more applied

economic crisis and the responses of Germans and French are well supported by mainstream economic theory. The true reason why Germans and French have different opinions on the matter has nothing to do with ordoliberalism or de-hermeneuticisation, but rather with distributional issues. Clearly, these differing opinions are part of a political conflict about who has to pay for the burdens resulting from the crisis.

We conclude with remarks on VDW's vision of Jihadist terrorism resulting from a Huntington-type clash of (de-hermeneuticised) religions or quasi-religions. While we mainly accuse the author of a superficial (de-hermeneutic!) reading of ordoliberalism and the Freiburg School of economics, we observe the same problem with the idea of de-hermeneuticised Islam. VDW's position is somewhat reminiscent of Gilles Kepel in his debate with Olivier Roy on whether the current terrorism problem results from a *radicalization of Islam* or from an *Islamicisation of radicalism*.²⁷ Combined with de-hermeneuticisation, meaning the Islam – somewhat mechanically – becoming “more fundamentalist (...) and less interpretive” (p. 80), the radicalisation of Islam argument becomes an oversimplification, as the *process* of radicalization is not explained. Roy, on the other hand, argues more psychologically and places greater emphasis on individual behaviour. Following his line of reasoning, a specific combination of individual traits and environmental influences causes radicalization. This is not simple mechanics, but can be traced back to concrete root causes. In addition, Roy considers the terrorists' religious beliefs in a jihadism that is strictly marginal to Islam. If Roy is right, and there are indeed good reasons to honour his arguments, VDW's clash of religions story is indeed inaccurate from both ends.

textbooks on economic policy, the idea of ordoliberalism is not considered, see, for one, Bénassy-Quéré, A. (2010). *Economic policy: Theory and practice*. Oxford University Press.

²⁷ For a popular account of the debate, see: New York Times (2016): *'That Ignoramus': 2 French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals*. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/europe/france-radical-islam.html>. For an introduction into the works of each scholar, see: Roy, O. (2004). *Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah*. Columbia University Press; and: Kepel, G. (2006). *Jihad: The trail of political Islam*. IB Tauris.

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